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If the government doesn't do something here... major cities [will] not
[be] covered, and if these cities don't have insurance, what happens to
America as we know it?1
[Federal intervention must not] allow insurance companies to rake in the
premiums from customers worried about terrorism while the federal
government is left with the bulk of the tab when losses occur.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
The events of September 11 were a shattering experience for Americans.
Long shielded from violence on their own shores, many Americans undoubtedly
viewed acts of international terrorism as something that occurred somewhere else
to other people. Be it bombings in Belfast or Bogota, shootings in Karachi or
Kashmir, or the endless stream of attack and retribution in Israel and the
Occupied Territories, terrorism was not perceived to be a threat to the American
homeland. Nevertheless, the calling cards of terrorists were unmistakably
present. The attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the destruction of the
Murrah Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 demonstrated the vulnerability of
Americans and their edifices to the evil designs of determined groups of fanatics.
The tide of anti-American violence in the name of Islamic extremism was also on
the rise in the late 1990s. The five years immediately preceding the final
catastrophes in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania saw the bombing of
the U.S. military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; the destruction of
the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; and the
attack upon the U.S.S. Cole in Aden, Yemen. On September 11, what could not
happen in America did, and the country has changed in ways yet to be fully
determined.
September 11 also constituted a watershed event for the insurance industry.
Prior to September 11, the most costly insurance event in world and national
history was Hurricane Andrew, which resulted in losses totaling $20.1 billion in
August 1992. 3 This loss stands to be dwarfed by the financial impact of the
1. Jackie Spinner, Insurers Seek Help with Terror Coverage, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2001, at El
[hereinafter Insurers Seek Help with Terror Coverage] (quoting Ramani Ayer, chairman and chief executive of
the Hartford Financial Services Group).
2. Editorial, Next Bailout: Insurers?, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 28, 2001, at C6 [hereinafter Next Bailout].
3. See Disaster Statistics, DISASTER INS. NO. (Disaster Ins. Info. Office, New York, N.Y.), 2001, at 4,
at http://www.disasterinformation.org/stats.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Disaster Statistics].
Other noteworthy world insurance losses include the Northridge, California earthquake in January 1994 ($16.7
billion); Typhoon Mireille, Japan in September 1991 ($7.3 billion); Winter Storm Daria, Europe in January
1990 ($6.2 billion); Winter Storm Lothar, Europe in December 1999 ($6.1 billion); Hurricane Hugo, United
States in September 1989 ($5.9 billion); European flooding in October 1987 ($4.6 billion); Winter Storm
Vivian, Europe in February 1990 ($4.3 billion); Typhoon Bart, Japan in September 1999 ($4.2 billion); and
Hurricane Georges, United States and the Caribbean in September 1998 ($3.1 billion). Id. at 4-5. In addition to
Hurricanes Andrew, Hugo, and Georges and the Northridge earthquake, the ten most costly insurance losses in
U.S. history include Hurricane Opal in October 1995 ($2.4 billion); Hurricane Floyd in September 1999 ($2
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events of September 11, estimates of which have varied from thirty billion dollars to
ninety billion dollars.4 Assuming the most recent estimate of ninety billion
dollars to be accurate, such a loss would exceed all of the combined insurance
losses in the United States for the period of 1993 through 2000. 5 Even assuming
the accuracy of a more modest estimate of sixty billion dollars, such a loss would
exceed the entire property and casualty industry's combined net income for 1999
through 2001.6 These estimates include one billion dollars in costs associated
with demolition and debris removal at the former site of the World Trade Center
in New York7 as well as an estimated cost of rebuilding in excess of eight billion
dollars. 8 These estimates are 120 to 180 times the $500 million cost of the
previous bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993.9
These enormous, and widely varying, loss estimates reflect the unprecedented
scale of destruction associated with the attacks. In New York, the attack on the
World Trade Center destroyed six buildings containing 13.3 million square feet
of commercial space and damaged eleven buildings containing another 16.5 million
billion); Winter storms in March 1993 ($2.1 billion); Oakland, California fire in October 1991 ($2.2 billion);
Hurricane Iniki in September 1992 ($1.9 billion); and Hurricane Fran in September 1996 ($1.7 billion). Id. at 5-
6. By contrast, prior to September 11, the three most expensive man-made disasters in the United States were
the Los Angeles riots of 1992 ($775 million), the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center ($510 million), and
the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 ($125 million). Press Release, National Association of Independent
Insurers, Insured Losses from Terrorist Attack Likely to Rank as One of Largest in U.S. History (Sept. 12,
2001) [hereinafter NAIl Press Release] (on file with author). All monetary denominations are in U.S. dollars
unless otherwise noted.
4. Estimates of losses fluctuated wildly in the months following the attacks. In the week following the
attacks, estimated losses totaled thirty billion dollars. See John Christoffersen, Insurance Losses from Attacks
Expected to Exceed $30 Billion, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 19, 2001 (quoting Keith Buckley, managing director
of Fitch Inc.); see also Steven Pearlstein, Collateral Damage, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2001, at HI. By mid-
October, loss estimates doubled to sixty billion dollars. See TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, WHY DO WE NEED
FEDERAL REINSURANCE FOR TERRORISM? 1 (Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://www.tillinghast.com/tillinghast/
publications/reports/federal reinsuranceterrorism/200205161O.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2003) [hereinafter
TILLINGHAST REPORT]. Estimates increased to seventy billion dollars by the end of November 2001 and to
ninety billion dollars by the end of 2001. See Arthur M. Louis, Insurers' Sept. 11 Bill May Double, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 28, 2001, at B3 (quoting John Scheid, chairman of PricewaterhouseCoopers's Americas
Insurance Group); see also Report: Disasters Spark $115 Billion Loss, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 20, 2001
(quoting an unidentified spokesperson for Swiss Reinsurance Co.).
5. Combined insured losses for catastrophes occurring in the United States between 1993 and 2000
totaled $70.4 billion. Disaster Statistics, supra note 3, at 6.
6. Terrorism Risk: Testimony Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 107th Cong. 1
(2001) (statement of Robert E. Vagley, President, Am. Ins. Ass'n) [hereinafter Vagley Senate Statement].
7. David R. Baker, Bechtel in Talks to Help N.Y Efforts, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 9, 2001, at BI. There were
four companies involved in demolition and debris removal at the World Trade Center site. Each company
received up to $250 million for its services. Id.
8. WTC Attacks Will Cost Nearly $40 Billion, FOXNEWS.COM, Sept. 29, 2001, available at http://www.
foxnews.com/printer friendlystory/0,3566,35388,00.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2002) (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
9. Gene Rappe, The Role of Insurance in the Battle Against Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 351, 368
(2000). The World Trade Center bombing in February 1993 killed six people, injured one thousand others,
created a crater approximately two hundred feet deep, and damaged the complex "five levels down and two
levels up" from the location of the blast. Jeffrey S. Green & Ira Tripathi, Coping with Chaos: The World Trade
Center Bombing and Recovery Effort, 27 URB. LAW. 41, 41 (1995).
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square feet of commercial space.' 0 In addition, hundreds of businesses were
displaced, including 430 businesses that leased space in One and Two World
Trade Center." By comparison, the commercial office space destroyed in the
attack on New York exceeded all such space available in Atlanta or Miami, and
the combined amount of damaged and destroyed space exceeded the entire amount
of such space available in San Francisco.' 2 In Washington, the attack on the
Pentagon damaged or destroyed two million square feet of office space. 13 The
attack on the Pentagon also generated 57,000 tons of debris and removal and
rebuilding estimates in excess of $700 million.
14
The September 11 attacks impacted numerous types of insurance. For example,
commercial property insurance policies that cover direct losses to insured
property, such as damage to buildings and their contents. 15 Such "policies may
[contain an endorsement insuring] 'indirect losses,' such as the interruption of a
business's income stream following the loss of its premises.'' 6 Equally impacted
may be inland marine insurance policies that provide coverage for special types
of personal property, such as computers and construction equipment.' 7 Commercial
property and inland marine "policies may apply on an 'all-risk' basis, [providing
coverage for] any cause of loss not specifically excluded, or on a 'named-peril'
basis, [only providing coverage for] causes of loss listed in the policy."' 8
Business income insurance provides coverage for income losses suffered as a
result of destruction or damage to the insured's place of business. 19 In a similar
vein, business income civil authority coverage protects businesses that suffer
10. Robert Burgess, Insurers Dispute Trade Center Claim, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2001, at E4; Dan Levy,
Scale of Destruction, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 19, 2001, at Dl. In addition to the combined 9.4 million square feet of
commercial space located in One and Two World Trade Center, approximately four million additional square
feet were lost in the destruction of World Trade Centers Four, Five, Six, and Seven. Burgess, supra note 10.
11. Michael S. Hiller, Acts of War Exclusions Do Not Apply in Tragedy, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 19, 2001, at 1;
Inside the Towers, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 13, 2001, at D8; Peter Sinton & Victoria Colliver, Bay Area Firms Join
List of Those Taking Big Hit from New York Attack, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 12, 2001, at B1. Margaret A.
Woodbury, Skyscraper Reopens at Ground Zero, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 26, 2001, at A7. Several companies
suffered significant losses with respect to their leased commercial space in the World Trade Center complex.
For example, the ten largest tenants occupied 4.7 million square feet, which was more than half of the available
space in One and Two World Trade Centers combined. See Sinton & Colliver, supra note 11.
12. Michael Grunwald, Terror's Damage: Calculating the Devastation, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2001, at
A12; Levy, supra note 10. For purposes of comparison, San Francisco's northern Financial District has 25
million square feet of commercial office space presently available, which amount is 4.9 million square feet less
than that which was destroyed or damaged in the attack upon the World Trade Center. Levy, supra note 10.
13. Pentagon Picks Up Pieces of Lives, Limestone, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 2, 2002, at A7.
14. Id
15. See Jack P. Gibson, et al., Attack on America: The Insurance Coverage Issues Part 2: General
Coverage Provisions, IRMI INSIGHTS, (Int'l Risk Mgmt. Inst., Inc., Wash., D.C.), at I (Sept. 2001), available at




19. Id. at 1-2.
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income losses as a result of the denial of access to their premises by civil authorities.
20
Income losses suffered by businesses as a result of their dependence on a
business whose premises have been destroyed or damaged may be covered by
contingent business income coverage.21 Other impacted policies include those
relating to general liability insurance, life insurance, workers' compensation,
health and disability insurance, homeowners' and renters' insurance, and automobile
insurance.22 According to Insurance Services Office, Inc., the September 11 attacks
have resulted in the filing of forty-nine thousand insurance claims in New York and
two thousand claims in Virginia.23
This article examines federal intervention in the private terrorism insurance
market. Part II of the article provides a general overview of the financial impact of
the attacks upon the insurance industry. In Part III, the article focuses on recent
federal initiatives to ensure the financial viability of the insurance industry in the
event of future terrorist attacks, including the recently adopted Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act. Part IV of the article provides a critique of the merits of the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. The article concludes by advocating a limited role
for the federal government in light of the continuing threat that terrorist attacks
pose to the insurance industry's financial health.
II. SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY: THE
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Financial Impact of September 11 on the Insurance Industry
The September 11 attacks had a widely varying financial impact on insurance
companies depending upon the type of coverage at issue. For example, commercial
property losses as a result of the World Trade Center attack varied from a low of
$8.5 billion to a high of $25 billion.24 Business interruption claims have been
valued as low as five billion dollars to as high as twenty-one billion dollars.25
Aviation insurance policies were also impacted with anticipated losses of $6
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id. at 2-3.
22. Id. at 3-7; Norman B. Amoff & Sue C. Jacobs, Terrorism's Effects and Insurance Coverage, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 9, 2001, at 3.
23. Property Losses to Top $20 Billion, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 18, 2002. Insurance claims in New
York consist of thirty thousand personal, fifteen thousand commercial, and four thousand automobile claims. Id.
Insurance claims in Virginia consist of fifteen hundred personal, two hundred commercial, and three hundred
automobile claims. Id.
24. See The Impact of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks on America's Insurance System: Testimony
Before the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 6-7 (2001) (statement of Kathleen Sebelius, Comm. of Ins., Kan.)
($8.5 billion) [hereinafter Sebelius House Statement]; see also TILLINGHAST REPORT, supra note 4, at I ($12 billion);
Louis, supra note 4 ($25 billion) (citing John Scheid, chairman of PricewaterhouseCoopers' Americas Insurance
Group).
25. See Sebelius House Statement, supra note 24, at 7-8 ($8.8 billion); see also TILLINGHAST REPORT,
supra note 4, at 1 ($7 billion); Grunwald, supra note 12 ($21 billion).
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billion for loss of life and $434 million in hull coverage resulting from the
destruction of the four hijacked aircraft.26 In addition, it has been forecast that
automobile insurance policies for vehicles damaged or destroyed in the attacks
would be impacted by an anticipated ninety million dollars in claims.27 Life
insurance losses as a result of the attacks were estimated at between $900 million
and $6 billion.28 Finally, workers' compensation losses were estimated between
$2.4 billion and $5 billion.29
The enormity of these losses becomes more apparent when particularized by
an individual company. Among U.S. insurance companies, the greatest losses
occurred in the reinsurance industry. Berkshire Hathaway suffered $2.2 billion in
losses, St. Paul lost $659 million, while CNA Financial Corporation suffered losses
totaling $304 million.3 ° Commercial property, casualty, and liability companies
also posted large losses. For example, American International Group of New
York suffered a pretax loss of $820 million as a result of the attacks while
Citigroup, Inc. incurred a $502 million loss.31 Other commercial property, casualty and
liability companies incurring significant losses included Hartford Financial Services
Group, Inc. ($440 million), Chubb Corporation ($240 million), and Allstate
Corporation ($32 million).32 As an industry, U.S. property and casualty insurers
paid $24 billion in claims in 2001, the largest amount in history, primarily as a
26. See Sebelius House Statement, supra note 24, at 10-11. Commissioner Sebelius's estimate of the
financial impact of the loss of life as a result of the destruction of the four hijacked aircrafts was based upon
insurance policies that American and United Airlines had in place at the time of the attacks containing limits of
$1.5 billion per occurrence. Id. at 10. However, other estimates of the financial impact of such losses reach as high
as twenty billion dollars. TILLINGHAST REPORT, supra note 4, at I. Commissioner Sebelius's estimate of the
financial impact upon American and United Airlines' hull coverage for the destruction of the aircraft involved
in the hijackings was based upon the replacement costs of Boeing 757-300 and 767-300ER aircraft at $89.5
million and $127.5 million, respectively. Sebelius House Statement, supra note 24, at 11.
27. Sebelius House Statement, supra note 24, at 9.
28. Id. ($900 million); see also TILLINGHAST REPORT, supra note 4, at 1 ($6 billion); Christoffersen,
supra note 4 ($3-5 billion); Kathleen Pender, Good Time to Update Insurance, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 21, 2001, at
El ($6 billion).
29. Sebelius House Statement, supra note 24, at 8 ($2.4 billion); TILLINGHAST REPORT, supra note 4, at
1 ($5 billion). However, it is important to note that Commissioner Sebelius's estimate did not include claims
involving inhalation of airbome contaminants. See Sebelius House Statement, supra note 24, at 8.
30. See Berkshire Estimates $2.2B Loss, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 20, 2001; see also Insurer CNA Cuts
1,850 Jobs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 5, 2001 [hereinafter Insurer CNA Cuts 1,850 Jobs]; Phil Rooney,
Berkshire Posts Third-Quarter Loss, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 9, 2001; Joe Ruff, Businesses Hit by New
Insurance Rates, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 12, 2001; St. Paul Cos. Reports $659M Loss, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Oct. 23, 2001. Berkshire Hathaway's losses resulted from its operation of General Re ($1.7 billion) and
Reinsurance Group ($575 million). See Rooney, supra note 30.
31. See Attacks Costly to Citigroup, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at E2; see also Citigroup Profits
Down 9 Percent After Attacks, REUTERS, Oct. 17, 2001 [hereinafter Citigroup Profits]. The losses suffered by
Citigroup, Inc., the leading financial services company in the United States, were a result of policies written by
its Travelers Life & Annuity and Travelers Property Casualty Corporation units. See Citigroup Profits, supra
note 31.
32. See Dave Carpenter, Allstate Earnings Tumble 65 Percent, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 18, 2001; see
also Insurer Says Loss Due to Terrorism, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 29, 2001; Linda A. Johnson, Insurer Chubb
Posts $240M Loss, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 30, 2001.
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result of the September 11 attacks.33 U.S. life insurance companies were
impacted by the September 11 attacks to a lesser degree. Nevertheless, major life
insurance companies incurred significant losses, as exemplified by the $210
million, $100 million, and $25 million losses suffered by MetLife, Inc., New York
Life Insurance Company, and Cigna Corporation, respectively.
34
Internationally-based insurance companies also suffered large individual losses.
As in the United States, reinsurance companies suffered the largest losses. For
example, Lloyd's of London incurred gross claims totaling $5.36 billion and
suffered a net loss of $2.8 billion as a result of the attacks on the World Trade
Center-the largest loss that the 314-year-old institution has ever suffered from a
single occurrence. 35 Munich Re and Swiss Re, the world's two largest reinsurance
companies, suffered net losses of $1.95 billion and $1.25 billion, respectively.
36
These estimates increased to $2.6 billion and $2 billion, respectively, by July 2002.37
Other major insurers suffering large losses included German-based Allianz AG
($1.3 billion) and Swiss-based Zurich Financial Services ($900 million).38 From
a global standpoint, fifty-five insurance and reinsurance organizations had
reported losses as a result of the attacks by the first week of October 2001.
Seventeen of these companies reported losses exceeding five percent of their
consolidated capital for 2000, and six of these companies reported a financial
impact exceeding ten percent of such capital. 40 Furthermore, in a decision
announced in October 2001, the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board
ruled that the attacks were not extraordinary from an accounting standpoint.41 As
a result, companies, including insurers, which suffered losses because of the attacks,
42could not list such losses separately on their financial statements.
33. Insurers Faced Record Claims in 2001, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 11,2002.
34. Cigna Sees Losses from Attack at $25M, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 1, 2001; see also MetLife Cutting 1,900
Jobs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 22, 2001; MetLife Earnings Fall 33 Percent, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 6, 2001; Jackie
Spinner, Insurers May Drop Coverage of Terrorism, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2001, at El [hereinafter Insurers May
Drop Coverage of Terrorism].
35. See Lloyd's Raises WTC Loss Estimates, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 27, 2001; see also Bruce Stanley,
Lloyd's Wins Reprieve on WTC Funding, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 26, 2001; Lloyd's. WTC Attacks Cost $2.87B,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 10, 2002; U.S. Gives Lloyd's Months to Pay Trade Center Insurance Claims, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 27, 2001, at A7.
36. See Attack Claims Put at $3.2 Billion, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2001, at E2; see also Alexander G. Higgins,
Reinsurers Double Loss Estimates, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 20, 2001.
37. See David McHugh, Munich Re Plans for Sept. 11 Claims, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 10, 2002.
38. See Allianz Sees $928M in Attacks Claims, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 21, 2001; see also Insurer Allianz
Posts Q3 Loss, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 14, 2001; Terrorism Strains Swiss Insurer, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 8, 2001.
39. TILLINGHAST REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
40. Id.
41. Adam Geller, In Accounting, Attacks Aren't "Extraordinary, " S.F. CHRON., Oct. 6, 2001, at B2.
42. Id. This ruling has resulted in considerable controversy in the accounting and insurance industries.
Dan Noll, director of accounting standards for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, noted
that "[tihese events certainly were extraordinary .... [i]t's one of these things where.., the devil is in the
details." Id. Todd Thomson, chief financial officer for Citigroup, Inc., responded by stating that "[i]f claims
payments caused by these events do not qualify as extraordinary, we fail to understand what other events
possibly would." Id.
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The losses associated with the events of September 11 struck the insurance
industry just as it was beginning to show improvement in its financial performance.
After a lackluster 1999 characterized by sharply higher underwriting losses, the
industry began to show improvement in 2000 primarily as a result of growth in
premiums and investment income.43 The year 2001 was deemed "pivotal for
property/casualty insurers... with significantly improved growth prospects and a
slight improvement in underwriting performance. ''44 Unfortunately, this prediction
proved inaccurate as the September 11 attacks and other man-made and natural
disasters cost the world's insurance industry $34.4 billion for covered property
and business losses in 2001. Losses resulting from the attacks, when combined
with a nineteen billion dollar decrease in industry surplus through the first six
months of the year, led analysts to conclude that the industry was "extremely
vulnerable to the impacts of catastrophe losses and the weak investment
climate.'A6 Despite expressions of confidence by financial analysts, trade associations,
and consumer groups47 that the industry could cover all losses associated with the
September 11 attacks, as many as seventeen insurance and reinsurance companies
could ultimately be placed on watch lists by rating agencies as a result of their
individual losses stemming from the attacks.4a
43. ROBERT P. HARTWIG, INS. INFO. INST., 2000-YEAR END RESULTS 1 (2000) [hereinafter YEAR END
RESULTS 2000], available at http://www.iii.org/media/industry/financials/2000yearend/content.print (last visited Nov.
13, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The insurance industry suffered a $32.6 billion losses in 2000
after subtracting $329.4 billion in incurred losses and expenses and paid dividends from earned premiums totaling
$296.8 billion. Id at 4. This loss was offset by $58.3 billion in investment income and realized capital gains, resulting
in pre-tax income of $25.7 billion and net after-tax income of $20.2 billion. Id. The industry surplus totaled $319.4
billion at the end of 2000. Id In 1999, the industry incurred an underwriting loss of $23.4 billion after deducting
incurred losses, expenses, and paid dividends of $306.3 billion from earned premiums of $282.9 billion. ROBERT P.
HARTWIG, INS. INFO. INST., 1999-YEAR END RESULTS 3 (1999) [hereinafter YEAR END RESULTS 1999], available at
http://www.iii.org/media/industry/financials/1999endofyear/content.print (last visited Nov. 13, 2002) (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review). This loss was offset by investment income and realized capital gains of $52.3 billion,
which resulted in pre-tax income of $27.6 billion and net after-tax income of $22.2 billion. Id. The industry surplus was
$336.3 billion at the end of 1999. Id.
44. YEAR END RESULTS 2000, supra note 43, at 2.
45. Swiss Company Reports on Disaster Costs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 13, 2002.
46. ROBERT P. HARTWIG, INS. INFO. INST., 2001-FIRST HALF RESULTS I (Sept. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.iii.org/media/industry/financials/2001 firsthalf/content.print (last visited Nov. 13, 2002) (copy on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
47. See Theresa Agovino, Insurance Stocks Drop, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 17, 2001 (citing the opinions of
industry analysts); see also NAIl Press Release, supra note 3, at 1; Press Release, National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, NAIC Assesses Industry Impact of Terrorist Attacks (Sept. 14, 2001) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); Jackie Spinner, Aid Critics Cite Insurers' Wealth, WASH. POST, Nov. 29,2001, at AI0 [hereinafter Aid Critics
Cite Insurers' Wealth] (citing the opinions of consumer groups).
48. Christoffersen, supra note 4; Aid Critics Cite Insurers' Wealth, supra note 47; Jackie Spinner,
Insurers See Terror Coverage Delays Unless U.S. Helps, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2002, at E3 [hereinafter
Insurers See Terror Coverage Delays].
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B. Industry Reaction to September 11
Insurance companies reacted to the losses associated with the September 11
attacks and potential losses associated with future attacks in a number of different
ways. Some companies, such as CNA Financial Corporation and Dutch financial
services group [NG, acted to stem losses through large layoffs. 49 Other insurers
immediately moved to raise premiums. Initial estimates of premium increases for
commercial property insurance policies of ten to thirty-five percent were quickly
dwarfed by what one member of the U.S. Congress characterized as exponential
increases rendering insurance coverage unaffordable for many U.S. businesses.5
In what has been described as "a feeding frenzy," premiums on commercial
property insurance and reinsurance policies increased by one hundred to four
hundred percent.51 Particularly hard hit by premium increases were the airline,
shipping, and energy industries as well as commercial real estate owners,
especially those who own or manage "iconic structures" perceived to be potential
future terrorist targets.52 In the months following the attacks, shippers and owners
of large commercial properties saw premium increases ranging from fifty to one
hundred percent.53 As a result, some property owners elected not to insure their
49. See ING to Cut 1,600 U.S. Jobs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 6, 2001; see also Insurer CNA Cuts 1,850
Jobs, supra note 30.
50. See Marcy Gordon, House Nears Vote on Insurance Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 29, 2001
[hereinafter House Nears Vote] (citing the statement of U.S. Representative John LaFalce (N.Y.), the senior
Democrat on the House Financial Services Committee); see also Marcy Gordon, Insurers Accused of Rate
Inflation, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 5, 2001 [hereinafter Insurers Accused of Rate Inflation] (citing the opinion
of J. Robert Hunter, the director of insurance for the Consumer Federation of America, stating that an
appropriate increase in premiums for commercial property insurance would be between ten and fifteen percent);
Jackie Spinner, Builders Face Rising Insurance Rates, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2001, at E4 [hereinafter Builders
Face Rising Insurance Rates] (citing the opinion of unidentified insurance industry analysts asserting that an
appropriate increase in commercial property insurance premiums would be between twenty-five and thirty-five
percent).
51. Insurers Accused of Rate Inflation, supra note 50 (quoting J. Robert Hunter); see also Juliet Eilperin
& Jackie Spinner, House Votes to Assist Insurers, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2001, at Al (noting that premiums for
commercial property insurance increased by as much as one hundred percent); Ruff, supra note 30 (citing the
prediction of Mark Lane, an insurance research analyst at William Blair & Company, that commercial property
owners should be prepared for a doubling of insurance premiums); Insurers May Drop Coverage of Terrorism,
supra note 34 (citing predictions of unidentified insurance industry analysts that reinsurance premiums may
increase by as much as four hundred percent as a result of the September 11 attacks).
52. Ruff, supra note 30; Builders Face Rising Insurance Rates, supra note 50.
53. Gerald D. Adams, Sky-High Premiums, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 27, 2002, at BI; Albert B. Crenshaw,
Businesses Face an Insurance Crunch, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2001, at E16. For example, the annual cost of
insuring Giants Stadium located in the Meadowlands Sports Complex in New Jersey increased from $700,000
to $3.5 million due, in part, to its proximity to Manhattan. Insurers Accused of Rate Inflation, supra note 50.
Another example is Marriott International, Inc., which announced in April 2002 that it expected a three hundred
percent increase in premiums when its insurance policies for its hotels renewed later in the year. Jackie Spinner,
Bush Urges Action on Insurance, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2002, at E4. A third example is the Mall of America,
located in Minneapolis, Minnesota and the largest shopping mall in the United States. Simon Property Group,
the owner of the mall, initiated litigation against GMAC Commercial Mortgage Corporation, one of its lenders,
on the basis that insurance coverage for terrorism requested by the lender cost three times that of all other
insurance maintained on the property. Jackie Spinner, Insuring Against Terror Costly, WASH. POST, Feb. 26,
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holdings against future terrorist attacks.54 With respect to aviation, Goshawk
Insurance Holdings, which insures aircraft throughout the world, reported that the
rates in its particular field had increased ten-fold since the attacks.55 Regardless of
their size, premium increases were an unwelcome shock to U.S. businesses that
had enjoyed drops in premiums in the 1990s as a result of aggressive price
competition and were presently mired in economic doldrums, if not outright
recession.
5 6
In addition to premium increases, several insurers, especially those in the
property and casualty industries, began to reevaluate the basis upon which they
extended coverage. One month after the attacks, Munich Re stated that the
attacks demonstrated the need for a "'fundamental reassessment' of the financial
risks from terrorism faced by the insurance business., 57 Executives at U.S.-based
Kemper Insurance Companies and Germany's General Cologne Re were even
blunter in their conclusion that terrorism is an uninsurable risk that should be
excluded from future policies upon initial underwriting or renewal.58 According
to insurers, the primary problem is their inability to predict and, thus, quantify the
risks associated with terrorism, including the likelihood and location of future
attacks and financial losses accruing as a result thereof.59 As a result, insurance
and reinsurance companies claimed they were unable to price appropriate
coverage with any degree of certainty.
60
As reinsurance companies began to eliminate coverage for terrorism in new
and renewable commercial insurance policies, primary insurers undertook efforts
2002, at El. A final example is the insurance policy for the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco, California.
The Golden Gate Bridge District, the operator of the Bridge, paid an annual insurance premium prior to
September I I of $500,000 for coverage of $125 million, which included coverage for terrorist attacks. David
Lazarus, Golden Gate's Terrorist Toll, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 3, 2002, at 131. The new insurance policy issued in
April 2002 has an annual premium totaling $1.1 million covering $25 million in structural damage and $25
million in lost revenue, but it is without additional coverage for terrorist attacks. Id.
54. See Jackie Spinner, Lack of Terrorism Insurance Puts Utilities at Risk, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2002,
at El [hereinafter Lack of Terrorism Insurance Puts Utilities at Risk] (noting that some utility providers have
elected not to insure their holdings against future terrorist attacks due to the cost of premiums, the minimal
scope of coverage, and the existence of industry wide caps on insurer liability).
55. See Cost of Plane Insurance Jumps, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 28, 2001 (quoting Chris Fagan, the
director of finance for Goshawk Insurance Holdings).
56. Crenshaw, supra note 53.
57. David McHugh, Reinsurer: Attacks Will Mean New Coverage Ceiling, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 18,
2001 (quoting an unnamed official at Munich Re).
58. See David McHugh, Insurers: Government Must Help on Attacks, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 22, 2001
(quoting Amo Junke of GeneralCologne Re that it had reached "the conclusion that terrorism, in itself, cannot
be underwritten."); see also Jackie Spinner, Putting a Price on 'What Ifs,' WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2001, at El
(quoting David B. Mathis, chairman and chief executive officer of Kemper Insurance Companies as stating that
"[t]he industry as a whole has come to the conclusion that the risk of terrorism is uninsurable").
59. Jackie Spinner, Insurance Industry Can Pay Claims, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2001, at El.
60. Insurers May Drop Coverage of Terrorism, supra note 34. Matthew C. Mosher, group vice president
of A.M. Best Co., an insurance ratings firm, aptly noted that "[t]he terrorism issue isn't an issue of capital....
It's an issue of not being able to price it." Id.
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to exclude terrorism from the scope of their coverage. 61  Consequently,
commencing in November 2001, insurance companies began filing petitions with
state insurance commissions seeking to exclude terrorism from commercial, home,
automobile, and life insurance policies effective January 1, 2002.62 Many of these
requests were based upon the National Association of Insurance Commissioners'
proposal to exclude coverage in commercial insurance policies for losses
incurred as a result of terrorist activities in excess of twenty-five million
dollars. 63 Thirty-six states and territories had accepted this proposal at the time of
the preparation of this article. 64 However, insurers were unable to obtain consent
from commissioners in two of the largest insurance markets in the U.S., namely New
York and California.65 In any event, the market for terrorism insurance, especially
for large and high profile buildings, has markedly shrunk.66 As noted by one
insurance executive, "[t]here is a clear and growing gap in commercial insurance
coverage that the private marketplace cannot cover.',
67
Insurance companies also petitioned the judicial system for guidance in
determining the existence and extent of their liability with respect to the
September 11 attacks. For example, Lloyd's of London and Aon Corporation, an
insurance broker that lost 176 employees in the collapse of the World Trade
Center towers, are parties to litigation in the United Kingdom and the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York.68 This litigation concerns
Lloyd's denial of a one-hundred-million dollar claim on a reinsurance policy
issued to Combined Insurance Company of America covering amounts payable
by it to the families of Aon employees killed in the attacks pursuant to a primary
accident insurance policy. 69 SR International Business Insurance Company, one
61. Jackie Spinner, Small Insurers Feel Sept. 11 Fallout, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2002, at E8. David B.
Mathis defended these efforts by stating that "[i]f the cumulative impact of a loss exposes your entire capital or
surplus of your company and you have no reinsurance for it, you have no choice." Id. Maurice R. Greenberg,
chief executive of American International Group, echoed these concerns, noting that "[y]ou have finite capital
in the insurance industry, and you can't cover infinite risk with finite assets." Jackie Spinner, Insurance
Executive Warns of Upheaval Without U.S. Help, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2002, at E3.
62. Jackie Spinner, Insurers Ask to End Terrorism Coverage, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2001, at El; Jackie
Spinner, Terror-Insurance Market in Limbo, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2001, at El [hereinafter Terror-Insurance
Market].
63. Jackie Spinner, States Move to Exclude Terrorism Coverage, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2001, at El.
The recommendation of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners was only with respect to
commercial insurance policies. The Association flatly rejected terrorism exclusions in homeowners and
automobile policies and recommended that state insurance regulators deny requests for such exclusions. Jackie
Spinner, An Appeal on Terror Insurance, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2002, at E3.
64. Michael Gormley, New York Nixes Insurance Plan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 8, 2002.
65. Id.; California Law to Cover Terrorism Insurance, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 8, 2002, at Al 1.
66. Jackie Spinner, In Search of Insurance, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2002, at El.
67. Insurers See Terror Coverage Delays, supra note 48.
68. Press Release, Aon Corporation, Aon Provides Update on Dispute with Reinsurers Regarding World
Trade Center; Updates First Quarter Earnings Per Share Outlook (Apr. 29, 2002) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review); Insurer May Take $90M WTC Charge, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 30, 2002 [hereinafter Insurer
May Take $90M WTC Charge].
69. Insurer May Take $90M WTC Charge, supra note 68. Aon set aside ninety million dollars to cover
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of the participating insurers in the World Trade Center, also initiated litigation in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking a
determination of its proportionate share of liability.7° The primary issue in this
litigation is whether the attacks on the World Trade Center constituted one
occurrence or multiple occurrences for purposes of calculating the total sum
payable to the lessees for the loss of the properties and rental income accruing
therefrom. 71 These claims remained pending at the time of the preparation of this
article.
The issue of whether an insurance company can refuse to renew insurance
coverage upon expiration of an underlying policy due to market uncertainty in
the wake of the September 11 attacks and the probability of future attacks is also
currently subject to litigation. In October 2001, Royal Insurance Company of
America notified the state of Maryland that, due to its inability to procure
reinsurance, it would not renew its insurance coverage for state-owned property
after the expiration of the applicable policies in February 2002.72 The notice of
renewal affected five hundred million dollars in coverage for such state-owned
properties as the statehouse in Annapolis, Baltimore-Washington International
Airport, and the Camden Yards baseball facility. 73 Upon the complaint of the
treasurer's office, the Maryland Insurance Administration barred Royal from
discontinuing the policy in April 2002. 74 This decision is currently on appeal and,
in a similar manner to the previously discussed disputes, will undoubtedly be
subject to resolution in a court of law.
In response to these problems and the perception of a growing crisis, the
insurance industry sought financial assistance from the U.S. Congress. Based
upon the "Pool Re" program in place in the United Kingdom, insurance industry
executives and trade associations proposed the creation of an insurance company
that would pool premiums collected from the private sector to be paid in the
event of damage to commercial property as the result of a future terrorist attack.75
Pursuant to the industry's plan, insurance companies would charge additional
payments to families of the victims in the event it was unsuccessful in its litigation with Lloyd's. Id. Aon further
characterized the amount it is seeking from Lloyd's as "potentially uncollectable." Id.
70. See generally Complaint for Declaratory Relief, SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Props.
LLC, No. 01-CV-0233 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also Trade Center Insurer Sues, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2001, at
E2. The entities named as defendants in the complaint include the lessees of the former World Trade Center
complex, their parent companies, and the lending institutions that extended credit to these entities to finance the
acquisition of their leasehold estates. Compl. for Declaratory Relief, supra note 70, 7-21.
71. Compl. for Declaratory Relief, supra note 70, 49-58; Vicki Lankarge, Swiss Re Says Collapse of
the World Trade Center is One Insured Loss, Not Two, Oct. 24, 2001, available at http://www.insure.com/
business/swissrel00l.html.
72. Jackie Spinner, Maryland, Insurer Battle Over Terrorism Coverage, WASH. POST, June 21, 2002, at E 1.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Jackie Spinner & Steven Pearlstein, U.S. Prepares Alternate Insurance Plan, WASH. POST, Oct. 13,
2001, at A7; Jackie Spinner, Insurers Push British-Style Plan, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2001, at E3 [hereinafter
British-Style Plan].
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premiums, five percent of which would be retained by companies voluntarily
opting to participate in the program.76 Participating insurance companies would
retain five percent of the risk for damage to commercial property resulting from a
future terrorist attack.77 The remaining ninety-five percent of premiums would be
utilized to create a common reinsurance pool of five to ten billion dollars, known
as "Freedom Re" or the Homeland Security Mutual Reinsurance Company, to
fund claims beyond the initial five percent contributed by participating insurers.78
The U.S. government would pay claims in excess of the pool's resources.79
Premiums would be established based upon perceived risk with purchasers in
major population centers paying higher premiums to obtain terrorism coverage
than those located in rural areas. 80 Terrorism would be included as standard
coverage in homeowner and small business insurance policies.8' By contrast,
larger commercial purchasers would have the ability to opt out of such
coverage. 82 According to industry representatives, a reinsurance pool would limit
"[t]he potential maximum loss for individual companies and the industry.., in a
way that allows [them] to service the coverage needs of ... policyholders while
remaining financially strong."
83
III. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE PERCEIVED CRISIS IN THE TERRORISM
INSURANCE MARKET: THE THREE LEADING PROPOSALS
AND THE ULTIMATE RESULT
A. The Bush Administration Plan
In contrast to the plan advocated by the insurance industry, the Bush
Administration presented its assistance plan in October 2001. The plan provided
significant federal assistance to insurers in the event of a terrorist attack for a
period of three years. Specifically, in 2002, the federal government would be
responsible for eighty percent of the first twenty billion dollars in claims
resulting from a terrorist attack and ninety percent of claims in excess of twenty
billion dollars.84 In 2003, insurance companies would be responsible for the first
76. Steven Pearlstein, Congress to Face Question of Who Will Share in Risk, WASH. POST, Oct. 11,
2001, at El [hereinafter Congress to Face Question].
77. Id.
78. Congress to Face Question, supra note 76; British-Style Plan, supra note 75.




83. Jackie Spinner, Insurers Say White House Plan Doesn't Spread Risk, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2001, at
A6 (quoting David B. Mathis, chairman and chief executive of Kemper Insurance Cos.).
84. Marcy Gordon, Administration Lays Out Insurance Plan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 15, 2001; Jackie
Spinner, White House Offers Insurance Plan, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2001, at A5 [hereinafter White House
Offers Insurance Plan].
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ten billion dollars in claims. 85 Claims in excess often billion dollars but less than
twenty billion dollars would be divided equally between the insurance industry
and the federal government. 86 The federal government would be responsible for
ninety percent of claims in excess of twenty billion dollars.87 Finally, in 2004, the
last year of the program, private insurers would pay the first twenty billion
dollars in claims.88 Claims between twenty billion dollars and forty billion dollars
would be divided equally between private insurers and the federal government
with the government responsible for ninety percent of claims in excess of forty
billion dollars.8 9 Under the Bush Administration's proposal, the insurance industry's
maximum liability would be twelve billion dollars in 2002, twenty-three billion
dollars in 2003 and thirty-six billion dollars in 2004.90 The federal government's
liability for terrorism claims was capped at one hundred billion dollars. 9 The
Secretary of the Treasury could request consultations with the U.S. Congress in
the event of an attack causing in excess of one hundred billion dollars in
damage.
92
The Bush Administration plan received a mixed reaction. Although the
administration plan received support from the insurance industry and state
insurance regulators, the proposal was subject to bipartisan criticism in the U.S.
Congress.93 The proposal was criticized as fiscally unsound and as amounting to
a federal guarantee of the industry's future profits.94 These profits would
continue to accrue to the industry without a countervailing continuation of risk.95
Other critics noted that federal taxpayers could overpay if the plan was adopted
and insurance companies charged policyholders inflated premiums for terrorism
coverage.96 The proposal was also criticized as leaving open the possibility of the
creation of a permanent governmental program.
97
85. Gordon, supra note 84; White House Offers Insurance Plan, supra note 84.
86. Gordon, supra note 84; White House Offers Insurance Plan, supra note 84.
87. Gordon, supra note 84; White House Offers Insurance Plan, supra note 84.
88. Gordon, supra note 84; White House Offers Insurance Plan, supra note 84.
89. Gordon, supra note 84; White House Offers Insurance Plan, supra note 84.
90. Gordon, supra note 84.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Jackie Spinner, States Support U.S. Terrorism Insurance Proposal, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2001, at A9.
However, it should be noted that industry support for the Bush Administration plan was not unanimous. For example,
David B. Mathis, chairman and chief executive officer of the Kemper Insurance Companies, characterized the plan as
failing to provide sufficient security for the industry by forcing it to retain excessive risk with respect to future terrorist
attacks. Id.
94. See Marcy Gordon, Insurance Proposal Draws Some GOP Criticism, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 24,
2001 [hereinafter Insurance Proposal Draws Some GOP Criticism] (noting criticism by Senator Jim Bunning
(Republican, Kentucky) that the Bush Administration proposal guaranteed the industry's profits at the expense
of federal taxpayers); see also Jackie Spinner & Glenn Kessler, Bush Advisers Concerned About Insurance
Package, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2001, at A20 (noting the criticism of Senator Barbara Boxer (Democrat,
California) that the administration proposal was "fiscally irresponsible").
95. Next Bailout, supra note 2.
96. See Insurance Proposal Draws Some GOP Criticism, supra note 94 (noting the comments of
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B. The House of Representatives' Plan
Despite a vigorous defense by the administration, the U.S. Congress failed to
adopt the Bush proposal.98 Rather, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted the
"Terrorism Risk Protection Act" on November 29, 2001.99 Federal assistance to
private insurers negatively impacted by a terrorist attack was triggered either by
industry-wide or individual insurer losses. The industry-wide trigger called for
federal assistance in the event losses exceeded one billion dollars.'00 The individual
insurer trigger was tripped in the event industry-wide losses exceeded one hundred
million with losses accruing to any single commercial insurer in excess of ten percent
of its capital surplus and net premium in force and effect at the time of the loss.'0 '
Section 19 defined an act of terrorism that triggered federal intervention as an
unlawful act that "cause[d] harm to a person, property, or entity, in the United
States, or in the case of a domestic United States air carrier or a United States
flag vessel ... in or outside the United States."'10 2 In addition, this unlawful act
must be "committed by a person or group of persons or associations who are
recognized, either before or after [the] act, by the [U.S.] Department of State or
Secretary [of the Treasury] as an international terrorist group."'' 0 3 The act must
constitute an attempt "to overthrow or destabilize the government of any country,
or to influence the policy or affect the conduct of the government of the United
States or any segment of the economy of United States, by coercion" but must
not constitute "an act of war."'1 4 Activities constituting an act of war were not
defined in the bill. In any event, absolute discretion to determine the occurrence
of an act of terrorism was delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury. 0 5 The
exercise of this discretion was not subject to judicial review.
10 6
The Terrorism Risk Protection Act provided for federal cost sharing for
commercial property and casualty insurers in the event of a terrorist attack within
the parameters of the industry-wide or individual insurer triggers. In the event of
an industry-wide triggering occurrence, the Act provided for assistance to each
affected insurer in an amount equal to the difference between ninety percent of
Senator Paul Sarbanes (Democrat, Maryland)).
97. Next Bailout, supra note 2.
98. See Spinner & Kessler, supra note 94 (noting Secretary of the Treasury Paul H. O'Neill's defense
of the Bush Administration plan: "Not one damn dime... would go to an insurance company because of what
[the Bush Administration has] proposed .... The idea that this is a bailout for an insurance company is
preposterous, and it only exists in the mind of the stupid. It's just outrageous.").
99. Terrorism Risk Protection Act, H.R. 3210, 107th Cong. (2001); Eilperin& Spinner, supra note 51.
100. Terrorism Risk Protection Act § 5(a)(1).
101. Id. § 5(a)(2)(A-B). In order for this trigger to be tripped, the insurer suffering the loss must have
provided commercial property and casualty insurance coverage prior to September 11, 2001. Id. § 5(a)(2).
102. Id. § 19(l)(B)(i-ii).
103. Id. § 19(l)(B)(iii).
104. Id. § 19(l)(B)(iv-v).
105. Id. § 5(b)(1-2).
106. Id. § 15(a)(2)(A).
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its insured losses as a result of the event and five million dollars. 10 7 In the event
of an individual insurer triggering occurrence, the Act provided assistance to
each affected insurer in an amount equal to ninety percent of the amount of its
losses and ten percent of its net premium in force at the time of the loss. l0 8 The
aggregate amount of financial assistance available from the government was one
hundred billion dollars with the possibility of additional assistance from the U.S.
Congress to address "severe losses" in excess of this limitation.'0 9 The assistance
program was to commence on the date of enactment of the legislation and end on
January 1, 2003, subject to the Secretary of the Treasury's decision to extend the
program for an additional period not to exceed two years. 110
Federal assistance received by commercial insurers as a result of acts of
terrorism was not without cost to the industry, private insurers, and, ultimately,
policyholders. Proceeds advanced by the government to the industry or to an
individual insurer were repayable through assessments and surcharges."' In the
event of a terrorist attack triggering the Act's financial assistance provisions, the
Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to determine an aggregate assessment
to be imposed upon all commercial property and casualty insurers equal to the
lesser of twenty billion dollars or the amount of financial assistance actually paid
to the industry or individual members thereof. 1 2 In order to collect this amount,
the Secretary was authorized to impose an industry obligation assessment in an
amount equal to the lesser of "the difference between [five billion] and the
aggregate amount of any assessments made by the Secretary... during the
portion of such covered period preceding the triggering determination; and the
amount of financial assistance made available under section 6...,113 In the event
that the aggregate assessment exceeded the industry obligation assessment, the
difference was to be collected through an additional financing assessment.
1 14
Payment of assessments was due no later than sixty days from an individual
insurer's receipt of notice from the Secretary of the Treasury.' 15
In addition to assessments, the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to
impose surcharges upon commercial property and casualty insurers in the event
that financial assistance extended pursuant to section 6 exceeded twenty billion
dollars." 6 The amount of the surcharge was to be established in the absolute
discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury upon consideration of "the ultimate
costs to taxpayers if a surcharge ... [was] not established; the economic
107. Id. § 6(b)(1)(A-B).
108. Id. § 6(b)(2)(A-B).
109. Id. § 6(c)(1-2).
110. Id. § 20(a-b).
111. Id. § 6(e).
112. Id. § 7(b).
113. Id. § 7(c)(2)(A)(i-ii).
11l4. Id. § 7(d)(1-3).
115. Id. § 7(0(2).
116. Id. § 8(a)(1).
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conditions in the commercial marketplace; the affordability of commercial
insurance for small- and medium-sized businesses; and such other factors as the
Secretary consider[ed] appropriate."1" 7 The amount ultimately set by the
Secretary was to be assessed and collected by commercial insurers as a policyholder
premium surcharge on commercial property and casualty insurance written after
the Secretary's determination.' 8 The sole limitation on the surcharge was that it
could not exceed three percent of the premium charged for such coverage on an
annual basis.1 19
In determining the method and manner of imposing assessments and surcharges,
the Secretary of the Treasury was required to take into consideration "the
economic impact of any such assessments and surcharges on commercial centers
of urban areas, . . . the risk factors related to rural areas and smaller commercial
centers, .. . and the various exposures to terrorism risk for different lines of
commercial property and casualty insurance.' 120 Failure to pay assessments or
charge, collect, or remit surcharges was punishable by a civil fine in an amount
equal to the greater of one million dollars or the amount of assessments or
surcharges due and owing.
1 2 1
Finally, the Act contained additional provisions concerning its relationship to
state insurance regulations and limitations upon private litigation arising from
future terrorist attacks. With respect to the relationship between the Act and state
insurance regulations, section 12 provided for the preemption of any state law
requiring or regulating terrorism coverage that was inconsistent with the Act.
122
In addition, any state law or regulation that prevented an insurer from increasing
premiums in order to recover assessments levied pursuant to section 7 was also
preempted. 123 Section 13 of the Act expressed Congress's sense that "the
[National Association of Insurance Commissioners], in consultation with the
Secretary [of the Treasury], should develop appropriate definitions for acts of
terrorism that are consistent with [the] Act.' 24 The Act recommended that each
state adopt these definitions. 125 Section 13 also expressed Congress's sense that
each state, in conjunction with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
develop guidelines for the maintenance of reserves against the risks of future acts
of terrorism and require disclosure of the price of terrorism coverage, including
the cost of related surcharges and assessments.1
26
117. Id. § 8(a)(2)(A-D).
118. Id. § 8(a)(3).
119. Id. § 8(c).
120. Id. § 9(a)(2)(A-C).
121. Id. § 9(d)(2).
122. Id. § 12(a).
123. Id. § 12(b).
124. Id. § 13(a)(1).
125. Id. § 13(a)(2).
126. Id. § 13(b)(1)(A-B), (c)(1).
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The Act also limited the right to initiate and prosecute litigation with respect
to injuries resulting from a terrorist attack. In the event the Secretary of the
Treasury determined the occurrence of a terrorist attack, injured parties were
granted a federal cause of action, which was to serve as "the exclusive remedy
for claims arising out of, relating to, or resulting from such acts of terrorism.'
127
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation was responsible for designating one
or more federal district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought
with respect to a specific act of terrorism. 128 These courts were required to apply
the substantive law of the state in which the act of terrorism occurred to all such
claims. 129 However, awards of punitive damages and prejudgment interest were
expressly prohibited. 30 Furthermore, the liability of each defendant was limited
to an amount of noneconomic damages in proportion to its individual percentage
of responsibility. 13 1 Awards for noneconomic losses without accompanying physical
injury were prohibited. 32 Finally, attorneys' fees for representing claimants in such
litigation were capped at twenty percent of the damages awarded by a court or any
court-approved settlement. 
33
However, the U.S. Senate failed to take up the Act prior to the end of 2001
and the concurrent expiration of approximately seventy percent of commercial
reinsurance policies for U.S. properties.' 34 Although Karl Rove, President Bush's
chief political advisor, sardonically noted that "[t]he world was supposed to
collapse on December 31 and we're still around," the failure of the administration
and Congress to act was roundly criticized. 35 State insurance regulators announced
that they would permit insurance companies that were still obligated to provide
terrorism coverage to deny claims from any attack that caused in excess of
twenty-five million dollars in insured losses. 36 Executives from a wide range of
industries warned of the consequences of the U.S. government's failure to adopt
a plan to assist insurance and reinsurance companies in the event of a future
127. Id. § 15(a)(l). Section 15 exempted any limitation upon "the liability of any person who attempts to
commit, knowingly participates in, aids and abets, or commits any act of terrorism... or any criminal act
related to or resulting from such act of terrorism; or participates in a conspiracy to commit any such act of
terrorism or any such criminal act." Id. § 15(b)(1-2). "[F]rozen assets of [terrorist organizations are also]
available for satisfaction of [any] judgment" that may be entered against the terrorist organization, subject to
presidential waiver for reasons of national security. Id. § 15(e)( 1-2).
128. Id. § 15(a)(4).
129. Id. § 15(a)(3).
130. Id. § 15(a)(5)(A).
131. Id. § 15(a)(5)(B)(i).
132. Id. "Noneconomic damages" were defined as "damages for losses for physical and emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of
society and companionship, loss of consortium, hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and any other
nonpecuniary losses." Id. § 15(a)(5)(B)(ii).
133. Id. § 15(a)(7). Any attorney demanding, receiving or collecting compensation in excess of the cap was
subject to the imposition of a two-thousand-dollar fine or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. Id.
134. Jackie Spinner, Congress Unable to Pass Terror Insurance Bill, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2001, at El.
135. Jackie Spinner, Bush Aides Seek Evidence of Insurance Woes, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at A8.
136. Marcy Gordon, Failure to Enact Aid Bill Criticized, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 21, 2001.
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terrorist attack. Standard & Poor's noted that "insurers offering terrorism provisions
would unduly expose their capital bases and invite ratings downgrades.., unless
policies were written with some form of government protection, such as a
federally backed reinsurance pool.' ' 137 Lending institutions warned that they
would be required to review their practices in major U.S. cities with respect to
large properties or those deemed to be high risk.138 The reaction of lending institutions
rippled throughout the commercial real estate industry, which expressed concern
with respect to the ability of developers to obtain financing and maintain
liquidity. 139 The pressure on real estate investors was increased in March 2002
when Moody's Investor Service announced that it would evaluate commercial
mortgage-backed securities on the basis of whether the underlying property was
insured against terrorist attacks. 40 Bonds secured by buildings without terrorism
insurance could be subject to downgrading, thereby resulting in increased
borrowing costs and difficulty in obtaining capital for new ventures.14 1 Private
industry also warned of "severe economic dislocation in the coming months if
insurance-related issues tied to terrorism are not addressed by the federal government
immediately.'
42
Numerous federal officials echoed these concerns. In October 2001, the
Secretary of the Treasury, Paul H. O'Neill, noted that "[l]eaving this problem
unresolved threatens [U.S.] economic stability.' 143 In his first statement on the
topic before the House Financial Services Committee, Federal Reserve Chairman
137. STANDARD & POOR'S, MAINTENANCE OF INSURANCE RATINGS DEPENDS ON MITIGATING
TERRORISM RISKS 1 (2001) [hereinafter STANDARD & POOR'S].
138. Terror-Insurance Market, supra note 62.
139. Insurance Industry Wants Taxpayer Aid to Escape Future Losses, Liability, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIBUNE,
Oct. 29, 2001. In this regard, Steven A. Wechsler, president and chief executive of the National Association of Real
Estate Investment Trusts, stated that lending institutions that extend loans to commercial real estate developers
"assume adequate insurance coverage for risk'.... 'If the system doesn't provide it, it has the potential to create
significant disruption."' Builders Face Rising Insurance Rates, supra note 50.
140. Jackie Spinner, Moody's to Weigh Terror Risk, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2002, at El.
141. Id. An example of such downgrading is the decision by Moody's Investors Service and Fitch
Ratings to downgrade forty-three separate debt issues backed by properties that are not adequately insured
against terrorism, including a loan pool for a portfolio of eight hotels owned by Host Marriott Corporation.
Terror Fears Imperil Debt Ratings, WASH. POST, June 5, 2002, at E3.
142. Builders Face Rising Insurance Rates, supra note 50 (quoting a letter sent to President Bush by
several industry organizations); Insurers Seek Help with Terror Coverage, supra note 1. The macroeconomic
impact of the failure of the U.S. government to adequately address the issue of insurance coverage for terrorism
was perhaps best summarized in correspondence forwarded to President George W. Bush by sixty trade
associations. In this correspondence, the associations stated:
Our market-driven economy is predicated on risk. Insurers provide much-needed security.
Without insurance, financiers cannot lend, and companies are reluctant to invest. Without
insurance, new construction would cease. All types of cargo would be stuck in place. Some
businesses may choose to cease operations after determining that the risks of continuing to
operate in the current environment without the ability to share potential losses is too great. In
addition, the potential benefits of the Administration's economic stimulus package could be
greatly muted.
Letter from Airports Council International-North America, et al. to George W. Bush, President of the United
States of America 1 (Oct. 25, 2001) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
143. Jackie Spinner, Insurance Uncertainty a Threat, ONeill Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2001, at A6.
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Alan Greenspan stated that "[i]t may be necessary ... for the Congress to
stipulate that in the event of a terrorist attack. . . the federal government, with
some deductible, would cover the cost .... 144 In the most comprehensive
governmental study of the impact of the attacks upon the market for commercial
insurance to date, the General Accounting Office concluded that the potential
negative consequences of the growing cost and unavailability of terrorism
insurance are cause for serious concern.145 Specifically, the General Accounting
Office found that insurers were shifting the risk of losses associated with
terrorism to property owners through the withdrawal of reinsurers from the
terrorism insurance market. 146 Primary insurers were also abandoning the market
as a result of their inability to obtain coverage from reinsurers.147 Not surprisingly, the
report found that the assumption of increasing amounts of uninsured risk posed
potentially grave consequences for private industry. 148 These consequences
would have the most significant impact on the relationship between commercial
property owners and developers and lending institutions. 49 The lack of available
and affordable terrorism coverage would serve to shift unacceptable amounts of
risk to owners and financiers as well as discourage new commercial development
and lending activities.150 The current state of the terrorism insurance market
could also cause conflict with respect to the maintenance of required insurance
coverage on existing mortgaged properties.' 51 In presenting the report to the
House Financial Services subcommittee, Richard J. Hillman, the General
Accounting Office's director of financial markets and community investments,
emphasized that the extent of the problem posed by terrorism to the economy in
general and the insurance industry in particular remains unknown.' 52 As such, the
necessity of federal aid for the insurance industry remained an issue for
legitimate debate. 153 However, he also warned of the "potentially significant" impact
of the problem upon the recovering economy and the "real and... potentially large"
consequences of continuing congressional inaction in addressing the issue. 
154
144. Jackie Spinner, Greenspan Backs Federal Backup for Terrorism Insurance, WASH. POST, Feb. 28,
2002, at E4 [hereinafter Greenspan Backs Federal Backup]. However, Chairman Greenspan also acknowledged
that "there is considerable dispute" over the necessity of federal intervention given the unknown nature of the
continuing terrorist threat. Id.
145. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TERRORISM INSURANCE: RISING UNINSURED EXPOSURE TO
ATTACKS HEIGHTENS POTENTIAL ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES, Rep. GAO-02-472T 15 (2002) [hereinafter
2002 GAO REPORT].
146. Id at 3-4.
147. Id. at 4-7.
148. Id. at 7.
149. Id at 10-14.
150. Id The Mortgage Bankers Association estimated that the lack of insurance coverage for terrorism
prevented the closing of $3.7 billion worth of real estate transactions in 2002 and delayed or changed transactions
valued at an additional $4.5 billion. Lack of Terrorism Insurance Puts Utilities at Risk, supra note 54.
151. 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 145, at 12.
152. Greenspan Backs Federal Backup, supra note 144.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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C. The Senate Plan
In response to these concerns, the U.S. Senate adopted the "Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002" on June 18, 2002.155 The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
was significantly different from its counterpart passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives. The initial difference between the two acts was the definition of
terrorism. In contrast to the House version of the Act, the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act defined an "act of terrorism" as an act certified by the Secretaries of the
Treasury and State as well as the Attorney General that is "violent" or
"dangerous to human life; property; or infrastructure; [and] to have resulted in
damage within the United States, or outside the United States in the case of an air
carrier or vessel."'156 Furthermore, the act must "have been committed [on behalf
of a foreign person or interest], as part of an effort to coerce the civilian
population of the United States or to influence the policy or affect the conduct of
the United States Government by coercion.'1 57 Acts committed in the course of a
congressionally declared war or that result in losses less than five million dollars
were specifically excluded from the definition. 5 8 The determination of the
occurrence or non-occurrence of an act of terrorism was final and not subject to
judicial review. 159 Participation in the program established by the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act was mandatory for any insurance company "licensed or admitted
to engage in the business of providing primary insurance in [the United States]"
or "if it [was] an eligible surplus line carrier listed on the Quarterly Listing of
Alien Insurers."'
160
The second major difference between the Senate and House versions of
terrorism risk insurance was the calculation of payments to the industry in the
event of a certified attack. Initially, no participating insurance company could
collect payment from the Secretary of the Treasury for a certified act of terrorism
unless it received claims from those suffering an insured loss, disclosed the
premium charged for insured losses covered by the program and the federal share
of compensation for insured losses, processed claims utilizing standard business
practices, and submitted a written claim.' 6' In the event that a participating
insurance company complied with these requirements, the federal share of
compensation was "equal to [eighty] percent of [the] aggregate insured losses
that-exceed[ed] the participating insurance company deductibles required to be
155. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, S. 2600, 107th Cong. (2002); Mark Felsenthal, Senate Passes
Federal Insurance Backstop, REUTERS, June 18, 2002; Jackie Spinner, Terrorism Insurance Bill Passed by
Senate, WASH. POST, June 19, 2002, at El.
156. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 3(1)(A)(i-ii).
157. Id. § 3(i)(A)(iii).
158. Id. § 3(1)(B)(i-ii).
159. Id. § 3(1)(C).
160. Id. §§ 3(6)(A)(i)-(ii), 4(c)(1).
161. Id. § 4(b)(1-4).
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paid for those insured losses; and [did] not exceed [ten billion dollars]."' 162 The
percentage was increased to ninety percent with respect to aggregate insured
losses that exceeded ten billion dollars. 163 In any event, if the aggregate insured
losses during any one year period exceeded one hundred billion dollars, the
Secretary of the Treasury and insurance companies were prohibited from paying
amounts in excess thereof.164 Rather, Congress was authorized to determine the
procedures and source of any such excess payments.
65
The term "participating insurance company deductible" was defined in the
first year of the program as "a participating insurance company's market share,
multiplied by [ten billion dollars] with respect to insured losses resulting from an
act of terrorism occurring during the [one]-year period beginning on the date of
enactment of [the] Act."' 66 Market shares of participating insurance companies
were calculated utilizing the "total amount of direct written property and casualty
insurance premiums for the.., company during the [two]-year period preceding
the year in which the subject act of terrorism occurred ... as a percentage of the
aggregate of all such property and casualty insurance premiums industry-wide
during that period."'' 67 This determination of market share was subject to
unilateral adjustment by the Secretary of the Treasury.' 68 Unlike the Terrorism
Risk Protection Act, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act did not require insurance
companies to repay amounts they received from the federal government as the
result of the occurrence of a certified terrorist attack.
The federal terrorism risk insurance program approved by the U.S. Senate
was subject to extension under limited circumstances. The Terrorism Insured
Loss Shared Compensation Program was scheduled to expire of its own accord
one year from the date of its enactment. 169 However, the Secretary of the
Treasury was authorized to extend the program for one additional year based
upon two separate findings of which he was required to inform the U.S.
Congress. 70 Specifically, the Secretary was required to find that "widespread
market uncertainties continue[d] to disrupt the ability of insurance companies to
price insurance coverage for losses resulting from acts of terrorism, thereby
resulting in the continuing unavailability of affordable insurance for
162. Id. § 4(e)(1)(A)(i)(l-ll).
163. Id. § 4(e)(1)(A)(ii)(I-ll).
164. Id. § 4(e)(2)(A-B).
165. Id. § 4(e)(3).
166. Id. § 3(7)(A). The "participating insurance company deductible" in the year in which the program
may be extended is calculated by multiplying the company's market share by fifteen billion dollars with respect
to insured losses resulting from a certified act of terrorism during the period in which the program is extended.
Id. § 3(7)(B).
167. Id. § 3(4)(A).
168. Id. § 3(4)(B).
169. Id. § 6(a)(1).
170. Id. § 6(a)(1)(A).
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consumers."17' The Secretary was also required to certify that such an extension
would "likely encourage economic stabilization and facilitate a transition to a
viable market for private terrorism risk insurance."' 172 In any event, the Secretary
was not authorized to extend the program beyond a single additional year.
173
The final difference was the absence of tort reform or limitation of punitive
damages in the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. In a similar fashion to the
Terrorism Risk Protection Act, the Senate created "a [f]ederal cause of action for
property damage, personal injury, or death arising out of or resulting from an act
of terrorism.,' 174 This federal cause of action was the exclusive remedy for claims
arising from such injury, damage, or death, other than claims against the terrorists
themselves. 75 All state causes of action arising from such injury, damage or
death were expressly preempted. 76 The sole provision relating to tort reform in
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act provided that "[a]ny amounts awarded in a
[federal] civil action .. that are attributable to punitive damages shall not count
as insured losses for purposes of this Act.' ' 177 The absence of such reform proved
to be controversial. A Republican-sponsored amendment to eliminate punitive
damage awards against companies whose buildings suffer a terrorist attack failed
by a party-line vote of fifty to forty-six. 178 This difference has threatened to
impede resolution of the conflicting acts. 179 In addition to continued opposition in
the House of Representatives for legislation that did not effect some protections
for companies victimized by future terrorist attacks and their insurers, the Bush
Administration signaled its willingness to scuttle the entire program without tort
reform. In a statement issued at the time of the Senate's adoption of the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, President Bush noted that he could not "support
enactment of any terrorism insurance bill that leaves the nation's economy and
victims of terrorist acts subject to predatory lawsuits and punitive damages."
80
D. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
In response to these concerns and after prolonged debate, the U.S. Congress
passed and President Bush signed the "Terrorism Risk Insurance Act" on
November 26, 2002.181 Federal assistance to private insurers is triggered by the
171. Id. § 6(c)(1).
172. Id. § 6(c)(2).
173. Id. § 6(a)(3).
174. Id. § 10(a)(1).
175. Id. § 10(a), (d).
176. Id. § 10(a)(2).
177. Id. § 10(c).
178. Jesse J. Holland, Senate Fights Over Terror Insurance, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 13, 2002.
179. Jesse J. Holland, Dispute May Hold Up Insurance Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 19, 2002.
180. Jackie Spinner, Terrorism-Insurance Battle Looms, WASH. POST, June 14, 2002, at E2.
181. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002); see also Mike
Allen, Bush Signs Bill to Boost Terrorism Insurance Policies, Wash. Post, Nov. 27, 2002, at A3; Edward
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occurrence of an act of terrorism that meets a four-part definition. In order to
constitute terrorism, the act must be "a violent act or an act that is dangerous to
human life, property or infrastructure."'' 82 Second, the act must result in damage
within the United States or outside the United States in the case of air carriers,
vessels and U.S. missions. 83 Third, the act in question must be committed by an
individual or individuals acting on behalf of foreign interests in "an effort to
coerce the civilian population of the United States or to influence the policy or
affect the conduct of the United States Government by coercion."' 84 Finally, in
order to qualify as an act of terrorism triggering the Act's provisions, the act in
question must be certified as such by the Secretary of the Treasury in
concurrence with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.185 All
certification decisions of the Secretary of the Treasury are final and not subject to
judicial review. 18 6 Acts committed in the course of a war, as declared by the U.S.
Congress, and aggregate losses resulting from an act in an amount less than five
million dollars are specifically excluded from the definition of terrorism. 187
All commercial insurers writing policies in the United States are required to
participate in the program established by the Act and write policies covering
terrorism as defined above. 188 The effect of these requirements is to nullify
exclusions for occurrences meeting the Act's definition of terrorism in place on
the effective date of the Act, specifically, November 26, 2002.189 In order to be
eligible for reimbursement in the event of a certified terrorism loss, insurers must
provide a "clear and conspicuous disclosure" to their policyholders of premiums
being charged for such coverage and the extent to which any losses are reimbursed
by the federal government. 190 This notice was required to be provided to existing
policyholders no later than ninety days from the effective date, specifically,
February 24, 2003.'91 Notice with respect to policies purchased within ninety
days of the effective date of the Act must be provided at the time of the policy's
purchase or renewal. 192 Policies purchased more than ninety days after adoption
of the Act must provide the notice as a separate line item in the policy.
193
Exclusions for acts of terrorism may be reinstated in the event the insured
provides a written authorization for such reinstatement or fails to pay the
Walsh, Two More Senate Victories for Bush, Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 2002, at A5.
182. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 102(i)(A)(ii)(I-III).
183. Id. § 102(1)(A)(iii)(1-II).
184. Id. § 102(1)(A)(iv).
185. Id. § 102(1)(A).
186. Id. § 102(I)(C).
187. Id. § 102(1)(B)(i-ii).
188. Id. § 103(a)(3).
189. Id. § 105(a).
190. Id. § 103(b)(2).
191. Id. § 103(b)(2)(A).
192. Id. § 103(b)(2)(B).
193. Id. § 103(b)(2)(C).
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premium for such coverage within thirty days after receipt of the required notice
from the insurer. 
194
In the event of a certified act of terrorism, the reimbursement provisions of
the Act depend upon when the act occurred. For losses occurring during the
transition period of November 26 through December 31, 2002, insurers are liable
for the initial amount of covered losses up to one percent of the insurer's direct
earned premiums for the preceding calendar year.1 95 For losses occurring during
2003, this deductible increases to seven percent of the previous calendar year's
direct earned premiums.1 96 In 2004, the deductible increases to ten percent, and,
in 2005, the final year of the program, the deductible increases to fifteen percent
of the previous year's direct earned premiums.' 
97
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act provides for federal cost sharing for
commercial property and casualty insurers in the event of a certified terrorist
attack. The federal government is responsible for ninety percent of losses beyond
the above-referenced insurer deductibles until aggregate losses for any program
year (or the transition period and 2003 combined) reach one hundred billion
dollars.1 98 Insurers are responsible for the remaining ten percent of such
aggregate losses beyond their deductibles.1 99 Compensation from the federal
government must be reduced by any compensation provided by the federal
government to any person under any other federal program.200 Federal assistance
to insurers is capped at one hundred billion dollars. 20  The U.S. Congress is
responsible for determining procedures for and the source of any payments to be
made to insurers in excess of one hundred billion dollars. 2 In any event, pro rata
allocation of federal compensation to individual insurers is within the sole
discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, whose determination is final and not
subject to judicial review.2 °3
Federal assistance received by commercial insurers as a result of acts of
terrorism is not without cost to the industry, private insurers and, ultimately,
policyholders. There are two separate methods by which the federal government
may recoup payments to insurers occurring as the result of a certified act of
terrorism. Mandatory recoupment of payments is based upon the difference
between the sum paid for losses resulting from a certified act of terrorism by
insurers, specifically the earned premium deductibles and ten percent
participation payment, and specified dollar amounts. These dollar amounts are
194. Id. § 105(c)(1-2).
195. Id. § 101(7)(A).
196. Id. § 101(7)(B).
197. Id. § 101(7)(C-D).
198. Id. § 103(e)(1)(A).
199. Id
200. Id. § 103(e)(1)(B).
201. Id. § 103(e)(2)(A)(i-ii).
202. Id. § 103(e)(3).
203. Id. § 103(e)(4-5).
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referred to as "insurance marketplace aggregate retention amounts., 20 4 If the sum
of earned premium deductibles and insurer participation payments do not equal the
aggregate retention amount for a given year of the program, insurers are required to
remit the difference to the federal government.0 5 The aggregate retention amount
206for the transition period and 2003 is ten billion dollars. This amount increases
to $12.5 billion in 2004 and $15 billion in 2005.207 There is no mandatory
recoupment in the event the sum of the insurer deductibles and participation
payments equals or exceeds the aggregate retention amount for a specified
year.20 8 The Secretary of the Treasury may also assess discretionary recoupment
to the extent that federal assistance exceeds any mandatory recoupment
amount. 209 The amount of such discretionary recoupment is based upon the cost
to taxpayers if no additional recoupment is assessed, economic conditions in the
marketplace, the affordability of insurance to small and medium-sized
businesses, and other factors the Secretary deems relevant.210
Recoupment is to be achieved through policy surcharges on property and
casualty insurance policies in force and effect after the date of establishment of
the recoupment amount. This surcharge is to be established by the Secretary
211based upon a percentage of the premiums charged to such policyholders.
However, such surcharges may not exceed three percent of the premium charged
to policyholders on an annual basis. 212 In determining the method and manner of
imposing surcharges, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to take into
consideration "the economic impact of any such assessments and surcharges on
commercial centers of urban areas ... the risk factors related to rural areas and
smaller commercial centers ... and the various exposures to terrorism risk for
different lines of insurance. Insurers are legally obligated to collect such
surcharges and remit them to the Secretary.21 4 Failure to collect or remit
surcharges is punishable by a civil fine in an amount equal to the greater of one
million dollars or the amount of surcharges due and owing.
215
Finally, the Act contains additional provisions concerning its relationship to
state insurance regulations and limitations upon private litigation arising from
future terrorist attacks. With respect to the relationship between the Act and state
insurance regulations, section 105 provides for the preemption of any state law
204. Id. § 103(e)(6).
205. Id. § 103(e)(7)(A)(i-ii).
206. Id. § 103(e)(6)(A)(i-ii).
207. Id. § 103(e)(6)(B-C).
208. Id § 103(e)(7)(B).
209. Id. § 103(e)(7)(D).
210. Id. § 103(e)(7)(D)(i-iv).
211. Id. § 103(e)(8)(A)(i-iii).
212. Id. § 103(e)(8)(C).
213. Id. § 103(e)(8)(D)(i)(l-lIl).
214. Id. § 103(e)(8)(B).
215. Id. § 104(e)(1)(A) & (2).
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requiring or regulating terrorism coverage that is inconsistent with the Act.2 16 In
addition, all state causes of action of any kind seeking compensation for property
damage, personal injury, or death are preempted.217 In the event of a determination
by the Secretary of the Treasury of the occurrence of a terrorist attack, injured
parties are granted a federal cause of action, which shall serve as the exclusive
remedy for claims seeking compensation for property damage, personal injury,
and death.218 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is responsible for the
designation of one or more U.S. district courts as having exclusive jurisdiction
over all actions brought with respect to a specific act of terrorism.2 19 These courts
are required to apply the substantive law of the state in which the act of terrorism
occurred to all such claims.22°
IV. CRAFTING AN APPROPRIATE FEDERAL INTERVENTION PLAN
A. Existing Precedents for Federal Intervention
There is precedent for federal intervention in the U.S. private insurance
market. For example, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Damages Act of 1957,
operators of nuclear reactors are required to obtain insurance in the private market
to the maximum amount available and capitalize a secondary insurance fund.221
There is implicit government financial backing for accidents in which the
damages exceed the combined limits of private insurance and the secondary
fund.22 2 In addition, for the past thirty-one years, the federal government has
provided political risk insurance to facilitate private investment by U.S.
businesses in developing countries through the Overseas Private Investment
22Corporation.223 The federal government also provided federal reinsurance for
damages caused to property located in urban areas as a result of riots and civil
disorder. Established by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, the
National Insurance Development Program encouraged state regulators and private
insurers to make property and casualty insurance available for such properties.
224
216. Id. § 105(b).
217. Id. § 107(2).
218. Id. § 107(a)(1). Section 107 exempts any limitation upon the liability of "any government, an
organization, or person who knowingly participates in, conspires to commit, aids and abets, or commits any act
of terrorism." Id. § 107(b). Frozen assets of terrorist organizations are also available for satisfaction of any
judgment that may enter against the terrorist organization subject to presidential waiver for reasons of national
security. Id. § 201(a).
219. Id. § 107(a)(4).
220. Id. § 107(a)(3).
221. Atomic Energy Damages Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
222. Id.
223. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200a (2000).
224. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, 18, 31, 38, 40, 42 & 49 U.S.C.).
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Until its discontinuance in 1984, private insurers writing policies upon such
properties could elect to purchase federal reinsurance and thereby transfer the
vast majority of the risk associated with urban disturbances to the federal
government.2 25 Finally, through authority granted by the National Flood
Insurance Act, the federal government funds the National Flood Insurance
Program.226 This program offers federally-backed flood insurance to property
owners residing in communities that join the program.227 This program has
proven to be the most controversial of federally-backed insurance plans due to its
failure to generate sufficient income from premiums to accumulate adequate
reserves to meet the cost of future flood-related losses. 228 This failure has resulted
in occasional additional appropriations by the U.S. Congress as well as periodic
borrowing from the U.S. Treasury.229
Nevertheless, if federal intervention in the private insurance market with
respect to terrorism is warranted, the issue remains what form the intervention
should take. There are numerous international examples from which to choose.
For example, the United Kingdom's Pool Reinsurance (Pool Re) program insures
owners of industrial, commercial and residential property located on the British
mainland against losses caused by terrorist attacks. 230 Established in 1993, Pool
Re permits policyholders to purchase additional coverage from their primary
property insurer to protect against terrorism. 23' Insurers are responsible for the
first £100,000 with losses in excess of this amount paid from premiums
accumulated within a pool consisting of insurance companies and Lloyd's of
London syndicates. 232 Claims exceeding the pool's resources are funded through
an additional ten percent call on premiums collected by participating insurers,
investment income, and, ultimately, the British government. 233 It has not been
necessary for the British government to provide assistance to the pool to date.234
Another international example of government intervention in the terrorist
insurance market is Israel's Property Tax and Compensation Fund.235 Administered
by the Israeli Income and Property Tax Commission, this law levies a national
225. Id.
226. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
227. Id.
228. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TERRORISM INSURANCE: ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS FOR
PROTECTING INSURANCE CONSUMERS, Rep. GAO-02-199T 6 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 GAO REPORT].
229. Id.
230. Id. at 8. For an in-depth discussion of the British Pool Re program, see William B. Bice, Comment,
British Government Reinsurance and Acts of Terrorism: The Problems of Pool Re, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L.
441 (1994).
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property tax on Israeli businesses.236 The tax proceeds fund claims for property
damage directly resulting from terrorist attacks. 237 Claims for property damage
are based upon the market value of the property immediately prior to the
attack.238 Property owners may purchase additional gap coverage insurance for
differences between the market value of their property and its replacement cost
from private insurers or the government. 239 The Commission is not responsible for
payment of indirect losses, such as those associated with business interruption. 4°
Rather, it is the responsibility of property owners to procure private insurance for
such losses.
241
B. Critique of the Primary Provisions of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of
2002
1. The Necessity ofDefining Terrorism for Insurance Purposes
Despite their merits, the previously discussed forms of governmental intervention
were rejected by the U.S. Congress in favor of the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act.242 The Act has much to commend itself to the insurance industry and,
ultimately, to policyholders. The initial strength of the Act is its recognition of
the need to define terrorism for insurance purposes. There is universal agreement
among state insurance commissioners, trade associations and consumer advocates of
the need for a uniform definition in any federal insurance program.243 A uniform
definition is not only essential to determining those acts that trigger coverage (or
exclusions as the case may be) but also to the industry's future ability to measure
risk and price premiums accordingly. Any definition of terrorism should be free
from ambiguity and establish standards that the industry may use to support






241. Id. Israel also provides coverage to its citizens and visitors for medical care, lost wages and
personal injuries suffered as a result of terrorist attacks pursuant to the Law for the Compensation of Victims of
Enemy Action administered by the National Insurance Institute. Id. at 8-9.
242. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).
243. 2001 GAO Report, supra note 228, at 15; The Role of the Federal Government in Assuring that
Insurance for Terrorist Acts Remains Available to American Consumers: Testimony Before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science and Transp., 107th Cong. 13 (2001) (statement of Diane Koken, Comm. of Ins., Pa.)
[hereinafter Koken Senate Statement]; Federal Assistance in Assuring that Insurance for Terrorist Acts
Remains Available to American Consumers: Testimony Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban
Affairs, 107th Cong. 13 (2001) (statement of Kathleen Sebelius, Comm. of Ins., Kan.) [hereinafter Sebelius
Senate Statement]; Press Release, National Association of Insurance Commissioners, NAIC Adopts "Guiding
Principles" for Federal Insurance Pool Proposals (Oct. 17, 2001) [hereinafter NAIC Press Release]; Press
Release, Consumer Federation of America, CFA Supports Federal Treasury Back-Up for Terrorism Insurance
(Oct. 12, 2001) [hereinafter CFA Press Release].
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appropriate premiums. Furthermore, by including all terrorist attacks regardless of
their location within the scope of the definition, the Act eliminates the ability of
insurers to self-select those risks they choose to retain and those they are willing
to pass on to the government. Known as "cherrypicking," this practice occurs
when insurance companies choose to retain coverage for low risk structures
while only purchasing federal reinsurance coverage for buildings and other
structures deemed to be of high risk.2 44 By including high risk and low risk
insureds and their structures within its provisions, the Act serves to distribute the
risk associated with future acts of terrorism while simultaneously shielding the
federal government from assuming a disproportionate degree of exposure
associated with high profile structures.
2 45
There are, however, three potential problems with the definition selected for
inclusion in the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. Initially, the Act's definition
differs from that contained in other federal statutes, specifically those statutes
defining the crime of terrorism. The Act is much broader than its criminal
counterpart in that an act of terrorism may occur as a result of activities harmful
to property and entities.246 By contrast, the federal crime of terrorism includes
only acts dangerous to human life.247 However, the Act is narrower than the
federal crime of terrorism as it requires that the activity in question be undertaken
by persons or entities designated as terrorists by the U.S. Department of State or
the Secretary of the Treasury. 248 This additional requirement is completely absent
from the definition of the federal crime of terrorism, which conceivably applies
to all persons and entities regardless of their designation.
The Act and its criminal counterpart are also inconsistent with respect to the
intent required of those perpetrating acts of terrorism. Federal criminal law
requires the purpose of the alleged terrorist activities to be the intimidation,
249coercion or exercise of influence upon any civilian population or government.
Thus, a person committing such an act in the United States with the intent of
intimidating, coercing or influencing a foreign government or population has
conceivably committed the federal crime of terrorism. In contrast, the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act requires that the intent of the activity in question be to coerce,
affect or influence the civilian population of the United States or the U.S.
government. 250 This is a much narrower definition than provided by federal
criminal law to the extent that the required intent is limited to the United States.
The Act's reach is also narrower than federal criminal law based upon the
244. Insuring Terrorism Risks After September /1: Testimony Before Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous.
and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 4 (2001) (statement of J. Robert Hunter, President of the Consumer Federation
of America) [hereinafter Hunter Senate Statement].
245. Id. at 9.
246. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 102(l)(A)(iii)(I-111).
247. 18 U.S.C. § 233 1(1)(A) (2000).
248. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 102(1)(A).
249. 18 U.S.C. § 233 1(1)(B)(i-iii) (2000).
250. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 102(1)(A)(iv).
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exclusion of acts resulting in less than five million dollars in damage from the
definition of terrorism, which limit is not part of federal criminal statutes.2
Given the differences in these definitions, it is conceivable that a future attack
may violate federal criminal law but not constitute an act of terrorism for
insurance purposes. This possibility is exacerbated by the different governmental
departments authorized to make such determinations, specifically, the U.S.
Departments of Justice, State and the Treasury, and the different standards of
proof necessary to support such determinations.
2. The Financial Provisions of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
The second feature of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act meriting discussion is its
financial provisions. Analysis of these features leads to mixed conclusions. The
insurance marketplace aggregate retention amounts representing the maximum
amount that all insurers participating in the program will be liable to pay out for
certified terrorism losses in a given year may be too low. Given the wide variety
of potential instruments of destruction that may be utilized in future terrorist
attacks, the industry may be entitled to federal assistance for attacks that do not
resemble the extraordinary events of September 11. Furthermore, there has been
no indication of the source of these aggregate retention amounts. Most certainly
it is not related to the industry's ability to weather losses of this magnitude as the
industry has done so on a routine basis with other types of insurable (and equally
unpredictable) events.252 As such, it is reasonable to conclude that federal
assistance may flow to insurers for a "non-extraordinary" terrorist attack (if such
an event truly exists).
The generous assistance provisions may also discourage insurers from
implementing necessary reforms of their risk assessment, pricing and coverage
policies with respect to terrorism. This lack of incentive for the industry to
undertake reform, including risk mitigation, will impact policyholders who may
not receive needed encouragement to minimize their risk of incurring losses as a
result of future terrorist attacks. Although section 103 places a one-billion-dollar
cap upon the aggregate amount of financial assistance that may be provided to
the industry, the Act also permits Congress to address additional losses.2 3 This
authority presumably includes the ability to appropriate additional sums. There
would undoubtedly be considerable pressure placed on Congress to appropriate
such funds in the event of industry losses in excess of one billion dollars. This
pressure and the absence of guidelines for Congress to take into account in
appropriating additional funds may render the effect of any cap on financial
assistance nugatory.
251. Id. § 102(1)(B)(ii).
252. Supra note 2 and accompanying text.
253. Id. §103(e)(3).
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There are benefits accruing from the financial provisions of the Act as
drafted. Initially, the terms will permit the insurers to accumulate reserves that
will be necessary to underwrite the risk of terrorism after the expiration of the
Act. Second, the financial provisions should serve to maintain the solvency of
individual insurers that may be severely impacted by future terrorist attacks.
Furthermore, the Act's repayment plan imposes substantial requirements that
must be met by insurers as well as substantial penalties for noncompliance.254
However, the effect of this repayment obligation is somewhat muted by the wide
latitude provided to the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to recoupment.
The Act grants authority to the Secretary to waive mandatory recoupment under
specific circumstances. 255 Nevertheless, the repayment provisions do serve to
deflect some of the criticism with respect to the financial provisions of the Act.
These provisions also prevent the program from deteriorating into an open-ended
loan program to the industry.
The Act is also subject to criticism for fostering geographic discrimination.
Specifically, section 103 of the Act grants the Secretary of the Treasury discretion in
calculating and imposing loss risk-spreading premiums based upon geographic
distinctions. These distinctions include decreased risk factors and the magnitude
of loss associated with rural areas and smaller commercial centers.256 As insurers
are permitted to pass a portion of these assessments on to policyholders in the
form of a premium surcharge, consumers in certain areas of the nation, particularly
those operating in major urban and commercial areas, could be assessed higher
premiums. To the extent that such considerations reflect the fundamental
principle of pricing premiums to meet risk, section 103 makes perfect economic
sense. However, the war against terrorism is not a regional conflict but rather a
national enterprise, the weight of which should be bore equally by all sections of
the country. To the extent that combating terrorism is deemed a national problem,
any disproportionate shift of financial responsibility to specific regions of the
country pursuant to section 103 constitutes an unfortunate example of geographic
discrimination.
3. Preemption and Litigation Management: The Role of State Law
There are two additional criticisms of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act that
merit discussion. Initially, the Act runs roughshod over the traditional role of the
states with respect to the regulation of insurance. Specifically, the Act expressly
preempts any state law requiring or regulating terrorism coverage that is
inconsistent with the Act.257 The effect of such provision is that any commercial
insurer complying with its requirements is considered to be in compliance with
254. Id. §§ 106-07.
255. Id. § 103(e)(7)(B).
256. Id. § 103(e)(8)(D)(1)(i-iii).
257. Id. § 105(b).
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any state law requiring or regulating coverage for acts of terrorism. Presumably,
this means that any state rate law that restricts an insurer from increasing its
premiums in an amount necessary to recoup assessments is preempted.
The federalization of this portion of the insurance market is understandable
given that terrorism is a national issue worthy of national solutions. However, in
its eagerness to address the issue, Congress should not overstep its bounds and
lose sight of the expertise of the states in numerous areas of insurance regulation.
State regulations with respect to insurer licensing, solvency surveillance, rate
oversight, form requirements, and market research should not go by the wayside
in any attempt to administer a federal terrorism insurance program.258 Most
importantly, insurance providers should not be allowed to utilize any federal
program as a means of avoiding state consumer protection measures. 9 In this
regard, states should remain free to assist policyholders during the claim
settlement process. 260 Furthermore, jurisdiction over claim settlement practices
should remain with the states. 26' As a general rule, the vibrant role of the states in
insurance regulation should be retained to the greatest degree possible and, where
so retained, subject to the least amount of federal interference.
A final criticism of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act lies in its attempt to
restrain civil litigation and attorneys with respect to causes of action arising from
terrorist attacks through the guise of "Litigation Management." Of particular note
is the federalization of all claims arising from acts of terrorism as determined by
the Secretary of the Treasury.262 The creation of an exclusive federal cause of
action with respect to acts of terrorism is a further intrusion upon the role of the
states with respect to insurance regulation. There is no evidence of flooding of
state courts with cases relating to terrorism, the inability or incompetence of such
courts to resolve these cases or abuse of such venues by claimants or their
attorneys. The ability of the Secretary of the Treasury to unilaterally determine
the existence of an act of terrorism without judicial review is also of considerable
concern.263 This provision imprudently places the discretion to increase federal
jurisdiction while concurrently limiting state jurisdiction within the exclusive
authority of a member of the executive branch. This provision raises the specter
of industry lobbying of the executive branch for a determination of exclusive
federal jurisdiction and potential manipulation of applicable standards.
258. Koken Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 15; Sebelius Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 15.
259. Koken Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 15; Sebelius Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 15.
260. Koken Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 15; Sebelius Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 15.
261. Koken Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 15; Sebelius Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 15;
CFA Press Release, supra note 243.
262. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 107(2).
263. Id. § 102(1)(C).
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4. The Strengths of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
Despite these shortcomings, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act does contain two
important and appropriate provisions that should characterize any federal assistance
264program. Initially, the assistance program terminates after three years. A set date
for termination is consistent with the views expressed by government commentators,
state insurance commissioners, and consumer advocates. 265 The limits upon the
duration of the assistance program give the insurance industry time to determine
how and if to cover future terrorist attacks and how to price such policies. 266 In
fact, it may be the case that the assistance program contemplated by the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act does not continue for a sufficient period of time for the
industry to make these determinations. 267 The Act provides for this contingency
by requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to submit a report to the U.S. Congress
no later than June 30, 2005 assessing the Act's effectiveness, the ability of the
industry to offer insurance for terrorism after the termination of the assistance
program, and the availability and affordability of such insurance for
policyholders. 68 Despite this limitation, the Act fails to establish standards for
any future congressional determination to extend the Act's benefits. This lack of
standards constitutes a design flaw that raises the possibility of self-perpetuation
without careful monitoring.269 In any event, the result that must be avoided is the
creation of a permanent entitlement program that unjustly enriches insurance
companies through the collection of enhanced premiums without an
accompanying degree of risk and provides no incentive to the industry to take
appropriate action to price future terrorism coverage. Only time will tell if the
assistance program contemplated by the Act will actually be of limited duration
or prove to take on a life of its own.
The second important and appropriate provision contained in the Act is the
implicit recognition of the ultimate need for a market solution to the issue of
terrorism insurance. Ultimately, any federal assistance program should supplement,
but not replace, private insurance.270 As noted by the General Accounting Office,
private insurance providers should retain market incentives in any government
assistance program. 271 Retention of these market incentives recognizes the
industry's "long and proud record of finding ways to overcome new obstacles while
advancing its business goals and serving the interests of the insurance-buying
264. Id. § 108(a).
265. 2001 GAO REPORT, supra note 228, at 16; Koken Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 13; Sebelius
Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 13; NAIC Press Release, supra note 243; CFA Press Release, supra note 243.
266. Koken Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 8; Sebelius Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 8.
267. See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 137, at 2 (contending that any "envisaged withdrawal by
[the] federal government after 2004 raises questions about the future strength of commercial-lines carriers.").
268. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, § 108(d)(1-2).
269. 2001 GAO REPORT, supra note 228, at 17.
270. Hunter Senate Statement, supra note 244, at 13.
271. 2001 GAO REPORT, supra note 228, at 16.
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public." 272 For example, the industry has discovered methods by which "to assess
and insure extremely large and difficult risks that were initially considered
uninsurable... [and] weathered enormous financial losses" associated with claims
relating to asbestos, environmental contamination, and medical malpractice. 273 By
requiring the industry to retain some degree of risk and repay a portion of any
federal assistance, private firms will have the proper incentive to maximize
efficiency with respect to setting premiums, establishing underwriting policies,
and handling and adjusting claims.274 Although the Act may allocate a
disproportionate share of risk to the federal government and, ultimately, U.S.
taxpayers, its recognition of the primacy of the private market in addressing the
issues raised by the events of September 11 is a step in the proper direction.
V. CONCLUSION
September 11 was a watershed event for the insurance industry. Prior to the
attacks, coverage for acts of terrorism was extended on a routine basis on most
commercial property and casualty policies. The industry's most serious concerns
were related to natural catastrophes, the 10 most costly of which in the past 30
years cost the industry $77.1 billion on a global basis and $57.3 billion in the
United States.275 By comparison, the three most expensive man-made disasters in
the United States, the Los Angeles riots of 1992, the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, resulted in losses totaling $1.4
billion-an amount insufficient to make the top ten most costly catastrophes in
the United States or the world.276
By comparison, the losses suffered by the industry on September 11 are
forty-three to sixty-four times the combined amount of these three man-made
disasters and will most likely exceed the combined losses attributable to the ten
most costly natural disasters in the United States in the past thirty years.277 In
fact, it is conceivable that industry losses will exceed the combined losses for the
ten most costly natural catastrophes in the world in the past thirty years. 278 The
industry's new focus has now become man-made risks. One might conclude that
the insurance industry has met its greatest risk, and it is not Mother Nature, but
rather humankind itself.
One of the many lessons of September 11 for the insurance industry has been
adaptation to a newly perceived risk. It is not that the risk of terrorism was
previously unknown. Rather, it was that the magnitude of the destruction and
272. Koken Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 5; Sebelius Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 5.
273. Koken Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 4; Sebelius Senate Statement, supra note 243, at 4.
274. 2001 GAO REPORT, supra note 228, at 16.
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instantaneous financial impact were previously unimaginable.27 9 Even assuming
the accuracy of the more modest estimate of sixty billion dollars, the commercial
property and casualty industry still stands to lose more than its combined net
income for 1999 through 2001.28o Such a loss is 120 times the $500 million cost
of the previous bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993.281
In assessing the enormity of the risk posed by terrorism, the insurance
industry would be well-served to note that ultimate responsibility for adapting to
this risk lies with the industry itself. Nevertheless, a strong case now appears for
limited federal intervention in the commercial property and casualty insurance
industries. 282 The U.S. government must now realize that which has been long
known to other governments, most notably the British and Israeli governments,
that the health of a significant portion of the economy is reliant upon the ability
of private industry to procure and maintain affordable insurance. Any inability to
obtain and retain such insurance in the wake of September 11 will seriously
hinder the ability of the economy to rebound from its current doldrums and
hamstring future growth. The reluctance of companies to reveal their lack of
terrorism coverage and subsequent anecdotal nature of the inability to obtain such
coverage is of no consequence. Despite considerable delay, the federal government
has acted through the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, the effectiveness of which
remains to be determined.
Nonetheless, the government must resist two temptations. Initially, it must
avoid trying to do too much in a hasty manner. The natural inclination of
government under such circumstances is to overreact in an impulsive fashion.
This has already occurred with respect to the overreaching nature and
intrusiveness of the USA PATRIOT Act.' 83 Traces of this same inclination are
279. See Alexander G. Higgins, Reinsurers Double Loss Estimates, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 20, 2001
(quoting an unidentified spokesperson for Munich Reinsurance as stating that "[tIhe attacks have revealed a
previously unimaginable risk potential").
280. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
281. Id.
282. See Jackie Spinner, Bush to Renew Insurance Drive, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2002, at E6 (citing the
opinion of Deborah B. Beck, the executive vice president of the Real Estate Board of New York, that
"[terrorism insurance is] clearly a problem that is beyond the individual property owner and insurance
industry's capacity to solve on their own.").
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Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001." Drafted and adopted by the U.S. Congress largely without the
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Oct. 27, 2001, at A6; see also Jonathan Krim & Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Bush Signs into Law New Enforcement
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money laundering and currency crimes, detention of suspected terrorists, the removal of obstacles to
investigating terrorism, and the strengthening criminal laws against terrorism. See generally USA PATRIOT
Act, §§ 201-25, 312-77, 413-18, 501-08, 801-17; see also Steve Fainaru, Suspect Held 8 Months Without Seeing
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evident in aspects of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. Such overreaction must
not be permitted to occur at the undue expense of taxpayers with respect to any
future plan to assist the insurance industry.
Congress must also resist the temptation to politicize the issue of financial
assistance to the industry. This is not a Republican or Democratic issue but rather
one of the continuing financial well-being of the country. Industry trade
associations must resist the temptation to overreach, and consumer protection
advocates must quell their tendency to demonize the industry at every turn.
Future cooperative efforts in the national interest cannot be permitted to
degenerate into political bloodbaths. 284 Ultimately, with an even-handed approach
by the federal government, cooperation between competing trade and consumer
interests, and adaptation to the changed circumstances by the industry itself,
insurance companies can emerge from the nightmare of the September 11 attacks risk
savvy and financially stronger. All parties will be severely tested, but their
success is absolutely essential. The stakes could not be higher, and ultimate
success is absolutely essential.
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